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ABSTRACT 
Distributed Denial of Services DDoS, attacks has become 
one of the biggest threats for resources over Internet. 
Purpose of these attacks is to make servers deny from 
providing services to legitimate users. These attacks are 
also used for occupying media bandwidth. Currently 
intrusion detection systems can just detect the attacks but 
cannot prevent / track the location of intruders. Some 
schemes also prevent the attacks by simply discarding 
attack packets, which saves victim from attack, but still 
network bandwidth is wasted. In our opinion, DDoS 
requires a distributed solution to save wastage of resources. 
The paper, presents a system that helps us not only in 
detecting such attacks but also helps in tracing and blocking 
(to save the bandwidth as well) the multiple intruders using 
Intelligent Software Agents. The system gives dynamic 
response and can be integrated with the existing network 
defense systems without disturbing existing Internet model. 
We have implemented an agent based networking 
monitoring system in this regard. 
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1. Introduction 
 
     Denial of Services (DoS) attack is a method of attacking 
a server by sending an abnormally high volume of requests 
on a network, which causes the performance of the servers 
slowed down. Consequently it becomes unable to provide 
services to legitimate users. Most common types of DoS 
attacks [1] are given below: 
 
1.1 Distributed Denial of Services Attacks 
     Distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) attacks 
consist of a large number of packets being sent from 
multiple intruders/attackers to a victim. These packets 
arrive in such a huge quantity that the resources at the 
victim like bandwidth, buffers or CPU time is quickly 
exhausted. The victim either crashes or spends so much 
time handling the attack that it cannot attend to its real 
work. Thus legitimate clients are deprived of the victim’s 
service for as long as the attack lasts. These attacks are 
widely regarded as a major threat to the Internet. They have 
adversely affected service to individual machines, major 
Internet commerce sites, and even core Internet 
infrastructure services. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distributed Denial of Services Attack 
 
 
    Denial-of-service (DoS) and distributed-denial-of-service 
(DDoS) attacks pose a grave danger to Internet operation. 
They are, in essence, resource overloading attacks. The 
goal of the attacker is to tie up a chosen key resource at the 
victim, usually by sending a high volume of seemingly 
legitimate traffic requesting some service from the victim. 
The over-consumption of the resource leads to degradation 
or denial of the victim’s service to its legitimate clients. 
     Many of these transactions must be processed in a 
timely manner and can be seriously delayed by the over 
utilization of the resources of victim by DDoS attack. The 
seriousness of the threat is further increased by the ease 
with which these attacks are performed. Any 
unsophisticated user can easily locate and download DDoS 
tools and engage them to perform successful, large-scale 
attacks. The attacker runs almost no risk of being caught. 
All of these characteristics have contributed to a 
widespread incidence of DDoS attacks reports more than 
12,000 attacks per week. 
    There are several features of DDoS attacks that severely 
challenge the design of TCP model [2] and security 
defenses: 
 
1.2.1 Use of IP spoofing. Attackers frequently use source 
address spoofing during the attack they use fake 
information in the IP source address field in attack packet 
headers. One benefit attackers receive from IP spoofing is 
that it is extremely difficult to trace them. 
     The other advantage that IP spoofing offers to the 
attackers is the ability to perform reflector attacks. The 
attacker requests (in the victim’s name) a public service 
that generates large replies to specific small-size requests 
(amplification effect). The attacker generates as many 
requests for service as his resources permit, faking the 
victim’s source address, and sends them to public servers.  
 
1.2.2 Large number of attacker machines. Even if trace-
back could be successfully performed in the face of IP 
spoofing, it is difficult to say what actions could be taken 
against hundreds or thousands of attacker machines. Such a 
large number prevents any but crude automated responses 
aimed at stopping attack flows close to the sources.  
 
1.2.3 Similarity of attack to legitimate traffic.   Attackers 
tend to generate legitimate-like packets to perform the 
attack, obscuring the malicious flow within legitimate 
traffic [3]. Since malicious packets do not stand out from 
legitimate ones, it is impossible to sieve legitimate from 
attack traffic based purely on examination of individual 
packets. A defense system must keep a volume of statistical 
data in order to extract transaction semantics from packet 
flows and thus differentiate some legitimate traffic from the 
attack traffic. 
 
1.2.4 Attacks to choke network bandwidth. In previous 
types of attacks, attacker used to spoof source address and 
destination address remains same because objective is to 
target one victim. But there are some types of attacks in 
which objective is, not a single victim but whole network. 
Such types of attacks are used to choke the network 
bandwidth. In these types of attacks, spoofing is done not 
only of source address but also the destination address as 
given in figure 2 below:  
 
 
Figure  2.  Network bandwidth choked 
 
 
2. Internet design flaws which makes attacks 
successful 
 
     Design of internet [11], opens security issues and create 
opportunities for attackers. A few of those are mentioned 
below: 
 
2.1 Interdependency of Internet security: 
 
     Distributed Denial of Services attacks are independent 
of the security implementation of victims; its susceptibility 
depends upon the state of security in rest of global internet. 
 
2.2 Internet control is distributed 
 
     Internet comprises a lot of networks which run 
according to local policies defined by the owners. There is 
no way to define and implement any global internet policy. 
 
2.3 Internet resources are limited 
 
     Each internet entity (host, network or service) has 
limited set of resources that can be consumed by a large 
number of users, which means that each and every DDoS 
attempt will be successful in case of absence of defenses. 
 
2.4 Intelligence and resources are not collocated 
 
     The end-to-end communication leads to storing most of 
the intelligence needed for service guarantees with end 
hosts, limiting the amount of processing in the intermediate 
network so that packets could be forwarded quickly and at 
minimal cost. At the same time, a desire for large 
throughput led to the design of high bandwidth pathways in 
the intermediate network, while the end networks invested 
in only as much bandwidth as they thought they might 
need. Thus, malicious clients can misuse the abundant 
resources of the unwitting intermediate network for 
delivery of numerous messages to a less provisioned 
victim. 
 
2.5 Accountability is not enforced 
 
     The source address field in an IP packet is assumed to 
carry the IP address of the machine that originates the 
packet. This assumption is not generally validated or 
enforced at any point on route from the source to the 
destination. This creates the opportunity for source address 
spoofing the forging of source address fields in packets 
Source address spoofing gives attackers a powerful 
mechanism to escape accountability for their actions, and 
sometimes even the means to perpetrate attacks. 
     We summarize all the above discussion about problems 
which the DDoS creates, are they consume resources victim 
machine so much so that it can’t serve its legitimate clients. 
One can’t trace the attackers easily. DDoS attacks are too 
simple to launch. At the same time, due to the DDoS 
attacks, a huge amount of bandwidth is also wasted as well. 
Ideally the DDoS attack should be blocked as close to the 
source of attack as possible.  
 
3. Existing Intrusion Detection Schemes 
 
     We have gone through many Intrusion Detection 
schemes. Working off all the schemes is impossible to 
mention here. Instead of it we have discussed the common 
methodology of all such schemes. 
    The most commonly used methodology for detection of 
intrusion based attacks is to capturing and analyzing 
network packets at end host or at network backbone, 
maintaining statistical information and comparing the 
traffic pattern to known attack patterns [20]. If found some 
pattern matching to some attack pattern, traffic destined for 
victim is blocked at which saves victim from attack but 
there is a high probability that legitimate users still denied 
from  services because it is quite difficult to distinguish 
between normal and attack packets.  
    All of the schemes can detect intrusion attacks on victim 
end but there are major limitations in such schemes which 
are given below: 
 
• Captures data [4] at victim or routers does a lot of 
calculations and graph based analysis, which is an 
overhead. 
• Can’t trace the intruders. 
• Not scalable and hence intrusion detection and 
prevention policies can’t be applied globally. 
• Solutions are proposed to change the currently 
implemented internet standard which is not a good 
approach 
• Although could save victim from attack but 
couldn’t save wastage of network bandwidth. 
 
From this, we observed that the schemes are confined to 
end hosts. The scheme which we have proposed is 
distributed using software agents. Before we move further, 
let us explain the Software Agent. 
 
4. Proposed System Architecture 
 
     In our opinion, DDoS attacks require a distributed 
solution. Since distributed solution has a lot of overhead of 
scalability, maintenance, that’s why we are using Agents 
which can provides code mobility (Mobile Agents). Hence, 
Agents [14] are key components of our proposition, which 
will be monitoring devices, making decisions collectively 
and changing routing policies over the internet. Before we 
explain our system let us explain briefly, what agents are: 
    Agent is a computer system, which is situated in an 
environment that acts on behalf of its user, in an 
autonomous way, to achieve its objectives. Agent 
architecture analyzes agents as independent 
reactive/proactive entities. Agent architecture 
conceptualizes agents as being made of perception, action, 
and reasoning components [15]. The perception component 
feeds the reasoning component, which governs the agents’ 
actions, including what to perceive next. Agent system 
architecture analyzes agents as interacting service 
provider/consumer entities. Agent infrastructure provides 
regulations that agents follow to communicate and to 
understand each other, thereby enabling knowledge 
sharing. Agent infrastructures mostly deal with the 
communication among agents based on a communication 
language using common ontological system.  Agents 
require some platform (environment) to reside on, which 
we can call as multi-agent system (MAS). In broader sense, 
it is composed of multiple autonomous components 
showing the following characteristics: 
 
• Each component has partial capabilities to perform 
a task 
• No global system control; subsystems are 
autonomous 
• Actors, resources and services are decentralized 
 
     We propose that network and different network devices 
should be monitored by Agents. We have divided the 
monitoring tasks of Agents as follows: 
  
4.1 Agents at stub routers 
 
     These agents are static and will be monitoring the end 
hosts. In case of any malicious activity like DoS attack, 
they will pass the information to agents monitoring 
intermediate routers.  
 
4.2 Agents at intermediate routers 
 
     These agents are static. Each of this type of agent will be 
monitoring the traffic at intermediate routers and bandwidth 
utilization between all directly connected routers to the 
intermediate router the respective agent.  
     The agents monitoring routers can change policies of 
routers in order to make the router block any kind of traffic 
passing through it. 
 
4.3 Auditing Agents 
 
     These are mobile agents [17], which can have any 
monitoring requirements from network administrators. For 
example, if it is needed to check the bandwidth available 
from one router to another, in existing scenario we have 
install different client-server based applications to check 
the available bandwidth. In case of our system, the 
computation methodology of available bandwidth will be 
provided to mobile agents [21], which will be moved to the 
routers between which bandwidth is to be monitored. In 
this way different additions and enhancements could be 
done very easily. 
 
4.4 Message passing between agents 
     Under different critical scenarios, Agents will 
communicate with each other in order to make the 
decisions collectively.  
 
4.5 System’s response for a distributed attack 
destined for a particular victim 
 
     In order to explain this, consider the given scenario: 
Different organizations having servers are providing 
services over internet. These organizations are connected to 
their respective stub routers. 
     The stub routers are then connected to intermediate 
routers as given below. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Scenario, Internet topology 
 
Stub routers will be monitored by static agents. These 
agents will be doing end host monitoring of the servers 
connected directly to stub router.  
     Each Agent, monitoring routers like intermediate routers 
will not have to monitor the servers but the bandwidth of 
the medium between the respective router and the routers 
connected directly to it. 
    Assume that a distributed denial of services attack is 
launched on a server at some organization by multiple 
intruders from different places. The agent at stub router will 
be doing end host monitoring for each host and hence for 
victim machine as well. As soon as this agent detects the 
resources of the victim machine to be consumed up to a 
certain threshold, it will change the policy of stub router 
and will make the stub router will start dropping some 
calculated amount of packet destined for victim (so the 
resources at machine couldn’t be over consumed and attack 
couldn’t crash machine) until it inform all the agents at 
monitoring at routers which are directly connected with the 
stub router.  
     Agent at stub router has detected the attack and has 
informed agents at intermediate routers and hence given 
responsibility to agents of intermediate routers. After doing 
this, the agent at stub router will change the policy of its 
router to normal. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Distributed intrusion based attack 
 
     Now agents at intermediate routers will check for the 
same type of attack on each of its interface and the attack 
detected at some interface, information will be passed to 
the routers connected at that interface in the same way as 
previously described until it is reached to intruders. When 
the intruders will be identified, then it will become very 
easy to identify the attack traffic. Moreover, when attack 
traffic will be blocked on intruder’s side, it will save a lot 
of network bandwidth as well. 
 
4.6 System’s response for a distributed attack 
to choke network bandwidth 
 
     When multiple intruders start throwing packets on 
network for choking network bandwidth, in this case 
packets are not destined for a particular victim. This means, 
destination IP address will also be spoofed in this case. 
     As we have mentioned earlier that static agents at 
intermediate routers will be monitoring network bandwidth 
of medium between other directly connected routers. 
Suppose some attack is launched with objective to choke 
the network bandwidth of a particular medium between two 
routers. The agents monitoring the routers will ensure that 
the bandwidth could not be consumed more than a certain 
threshold.  As soon as bandwidth consumption reaches the 
certain threshold, direction of incoming traffic will be 
determined by the agents of the respective routers. The 
agent at router from which traffic is incoming will 
communicate the attack information of attack to the agents 
at neighbor routers and a calculated amount of packets (to 
avoid over consumption of bandwidth) from router attached 
each interface will be dropped to minimize the probability 
of discarding legitimate traffic which can be called as false 
positive. 
 
5. First Prototype Implementation:  Agent 
based networking monitoring system 
 
     In the proposed system we need different types of 
monitoring agents doing different tasks to be developed: 
 
5.1 End host monitoring application 
 
     This application will be used to monitor the information 
of end hosts like CPU utilization, physical memory 
utilization, kernel memory utilization, processes, threads, 
running,  traffic capturing, different TCP and ICMP 
statistics.  
 
5.2 Agents monitoring traffic at stub routers 
 
     These agents will be monitoring hosts connected 
directly using the above application. 
 
5.3 Agents monitoring traffic at intermediate 
routers 
 
     These agents will be monitoring traffic at their 
respective routers and the bandwidth by different 
bandwidth utilization algorithms.  
 
5.4 Agents changing policies of routers 
 
    All the agents on routers will not be residing on the 
routers but capturing traffic and changing the policies of 
routers accordingly using terminal services (controlling 
routers). This means, agents will control all the system and 
there will be no need of human interaction. 
 
5.5 Communication between agents 
 
    It will help them work collectively. Since while system is 
being controlled by agents and different tasks are assigned 
to different agents. Any agent after detecting some anomaly 
will inform other agents by passing ACL (Agent 
communication Language) message. 
 
5.6 Mobile Agents 
 
    Mobile agents [17] are also very important part of this 
system. Our system is completely distributed. Mobile 
agents will help in maintenance and changing in working of 
different schemes. For examples the agents at different 
remote routers are calculating bandwidth among each other 
by some algorithm and it is required to measure bandwidth 
between the remote routers by using another efficient 
algorithm. This can be done by using mobile agents. 
Instead of changing the implementation at routers where 
bandwidth is needed to be measured, Mobile agents having 
the new algorithm could be sent at the routers and can 
measure the bandwidth using the new algorithms and can 
provide results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
    Most commonly used intrusion detection schemes for 
distributed attacks can’t accurately distinguish between 
legitimate and attack traffic at victim end and can’t trace 
the intruders as well. Distributed attacks detection and 
prevention systems require a distributed solution. At the 
same time distributed solutions are not easy to implement 
and maintain. Keeping in mind all such things, we have 
used software agents which provide code mobility that will 
help in maintenance of the distributed solutions like 
updating. Other monitoring agents are provided to change 
in policy implementation at different situations. Agents 
work collectively and make decisions at their own which 
make the scheme maintain network with out any human 
interruption. These agents help in tracing intruders as well. 
Since agents work on application layer and hence need not 
any change in existing internet standards and it will not 
cause burden on network devices as Agents will run and 
monitor traffic using terminal services of routers. It is 
scalable as well because if some of the intermediate routers 
doesn’t support the agents, will be ignored by the system. 
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